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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BEICW
The Supreme Court; has appellate jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant
to Section 78-2-2(3) (j), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, and Rules 3
and 4 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court has

transferred appellate jurisdiction of this case to the Court of Appeals
pursuant to Section 78-2-2 (4), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, and
Rule 4A of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.
jurisdiction under Section 78-2a-3 (2)

(j),

This Court also has

Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as

amended, and Rule 4A of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.
On May 9, 1988, Judge Richard H. Moffat of the Third District Court
signed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of law and Judgment in this case,
awarding

judgment

in favor of Plaintiff Terri C. Hardy and

against

Defendant Beneficial Life Insurance Company (hereinafter "Beneficial") on
an accidental death insurance policy.

Beneficial appeals this final order.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES H^ESENTED FDR REVIEW?

This appea^ presents the following issues:
1.

What standard is to be applied in cases of extended drug

misuse and abuse, where the question is whether the death resulting from
the misuse and abuse of drugs is accidental xmder an accidental death
insurance policy?
2.

Given the fact that Mr. Hardy recognized that the natural

and probable ccaisequence of M s course of acti on in abusing and misusing
drugs would be his eventual death from such course of action, did the trial
5

court err in applying a standard which required Beneficial to establish
that Mr. Hardy specifically intended or expected that the act of ingesting
drugs on the night of September 9, 1981, would cause his death on the
morning of September 10, 1981.
3.

If the standard which the trial court applied was the

correct standard, did the trial court misapply the facts to that standard
by failing to conclude that since Mr. Hardy understood and expected that
the eventual result of his course of action in abusing and misusing drugs
was death, then by necessary implication he must be deemed to have intended
or expected that his consumption of drugs on the night of September 9,
1981, would result in his death on September 10, 1981.
4.

Given the maxim that every man will be held to intend the

natural and probable consequences of his deeds; where the stipulated facts
demonstrate that the natural and probable consequence of Mr. Hardy's course
of action in misusing and abusing drugs would be his death from such misuse
and abuse, and where Mr. Hardy died from the misuse and abuse of drugs, did
the trial court err in concluding that Mr. Hardy's death on September 10,
1981, was unintended and unexpected and therefore accidental.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of the Case

This case arises out of a dispute over a claim for benefits
under an accidental death insurance policy.
Plaintiff's husband, Bryce W. Hardy, died on September 10,
6

1981, as a result of his misuse and abuse of narcotic drugs.

Mr. Hardy's

death was the result of an extended course of action in the misuse and
abuse of drugs.

In 1973, Mr. Hardy began losing Darvon (a trade name for

propoxyphene) and by November 1974, he was abusing Darvon through excessive
use.

Mr. Hardy continued to misuse and abuse drugs from 1974 to the date

of his death.

During this period of time, he was repeatedly counseled and

warned by a number of physicians and other health care professionals that
his continued misuse and abuse of drugs would be a life shortening process
and that he would end up killing himself.

In 1977, while despondent over

the failure of his first marriage, Mr. Hardy was hospitalized in a comatose
state as the result of an attempt to commit suicide by taking an overdose
of Valium and alcohol.

In April 1981, he was again hospitalized in a

condition of respiratory arrest as the result of an overdose of Darvon and
Methadone.
On the ni^tit of September 9,
urrietermined

and

undeterminable

amount

1981, Mr. Hardy consumed an
of

codeine,

propoxyphene

and

trimethobenzamide. On the morning of September 10, 1981, Mr. Hardy, at the
age of 29, died of ^combined codeine, propoxyphene and trimethobenzamide
intoxication".

Ihe drugs found in Mr. Hardy's body after his death may

lawfully be obtained only by prescription; there is no evidence that Mr.
Hardy obtained such drugs by prescription.
Mr. Hardy was a man

of normal

suffering from any mental disease or defect.
natural, probable and expected

intelligence

and was not

He understood that the

consequence of his continued misuse and

abuse of drugs would be to shorten his life and result in his cwn death.
At the time of his death, Mr. Hardy's life was insured under a

7

group policy with Beneficial. The policy provided Mr. Hardy's beneficiary,
his wife, Terri, a benefit of $25,000 if Mr. Hardy died an accidental
death.

Beneficial denied Mrs. Hardy's claim for recovery on the policy on

the ground that Mr. Hardy's death was not accidental.

B.

The Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Court Below

On January 27, 1988, Mrs. Hardy and Beneficial executed and
filed a Stipulated Statement of Facts (hereinafter "Stipulated Facts") with
the District Court and argued the case before Judge Richard H. Moffat.
(Record at 835-843, See Addendum A-l)

Both Mrs. Hardy and Beneficial

intended this hearing to constitute a bench trial and that the court render
a decision.

Judge Moffat, apparently under the mistaken impression that

the case was before the court on a Motion for Summary Judgment, filed a
Minute Entry on February 9, 1988, in which he denied Beneficial's Motion
for Summary Judgment.

(Record at 826-829, See Addendum A-2)

The parties subsequently wrote Judge Moffat clarifying that their
intent had been to submit the case to the court for a final decision on the
merits.

On May 9, 1988, Judge Moffat entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions

of Law and a Judgment.

(Record at 831-834, See Addendum A-3)

The District

Court found the facts to be those as stipulated to by the parties and made
the following Conclusion of Law:
As the stipulated facts do not demonstrate
that Mr. Bryce Hardy either intended or expected
that his consumption of drugs would cause his death
on September 10, 1981, the Court concludes that Mre
Hardy's death was the result of accidental bodily
injury within the meaning of the insurance policy
in question.

8

The District Court awarded judgment to Mrs. Hardy. (R. 833.)
On June 6, 1988, Beneficial filed a Notice of Appeal.

(R. 1063-64.)

On

July 29, 1988, the Supreme Court transferred this case to the Court of
Appeals.

C.

1.

Statement of F&cts

Bryce Hardy died on September 10, 1981, as a result of a

narcotic intoxication resulting from ingestion of drugs which may lawfully
be obtained only by prescription.
2.

(Stipulated Facts, paragraph 1; R. 835.)

The Utah State Medical Examiner's report listed the cause of

death as a "combined codeine, propoxyphene and trimethobenzamide
intoxication" and the Medical Examiner described the manner of death as
"Uraietermined", as distinguished from "Accident", "Suicide", "Homicide" and
"Natural causes".

R-850.

The Amended Certificate of Death listed the

cause of death as "combined codeine, propoxyphene & trimothobenzamide
intoxication" occurring from the "Ingestion of drugs" and described the
manner of death as "Undetermined if injured Accidentally or Purposely" as
distinguished

from

Investigation".

3.
her

"Accident",

"Suicide",

"Homicide"

and

"Pending

R. 853. (Stipulated Facts, paragraph 2; R. 835-836.)

Following Mr. Hardy's death, the Plaintiff, Terri C. Hardy, and

friend,

Julie

Shepherd,

gave

written

statements

to

the

police

describing the events preceding and immediately following Mr. Hardy's
death.

(R. 855-858, R. 860, R. 862) (Stipulated Facts, paragraph 3;

R. 836.)
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4.

The Mt. Pleasant City Police Department prepared an Incident

Report describing events on the morning of Mr. Hardy's death.

(R. 864-44.)

(Stipulated Facts, paragraph 4; R. 836.)
5.

Plaintiff's evidence would shew that on the evening preceding

his death, Mr. Hardy did not appear anxious or depressed and he made no
statements, oral or written, reflecting any intention to take his own life*
His activities, as observed by Terri Hardy, were routine and included
making preparations for the next day's work at his job, reading to his
children and watching television.
such evidence.
6.
10,

Defendant has no evidence to contradict

(Stipulated Facts, paragraph 5; R. 836.)

On the night of September 9, 1981, or the morning of September

1981, Mr. Hardy took an undetermined

amount of drugs containing

codeine, propoxyphene (Darvon) and trimethobenzamide (Tigan).

(Stipulated

Facts, paragraph 6; R. 836.)
7.

Codeine is a centrally acting narcotic analgesic. Propoxyphene

is also a centrally acting narcotic analgesic.
anti emetic agent.
8.

Trimethobenzamide is an

(Stipulated Facts, paragraph 7; R. 836.)

The quantity of drugs ingested by Mr. Hardy prior to his death

is not able to be determined from the autopsy, toxicological analysis or
any other existing data. (Stipulated Facts, paragraph 8; R. 836-837.)
9.

There

is no evidence of Bryce Hardy having

obtained by

prescription the drugs which he ingested on the occasion of his death.
(Stipulated Facts, paragraph 9; R. 837.)
10.

Defendant's evidence would

show that the drugs Mr. Hardy

ingested were self administered and were not prescribed by a physician for
medical purposes and constituted an abuse and misuse of prescription drugs*

10

Plaintiff has no evidence to contradict such evidence.
were taken despite treatment which Mr. Hardy had

The ingested drugs

received for withdrawal

from his addiction to such drugs and in contravention of the warnings and
counseling which he had received to step taking such drugs.

(Stipulated

Facts, paragraph 10; R. 837.)
11.
Life

At the time of his death Mr. Hardy was insured by Beneficial

Insurance

Company under the terms of two group policies.

One

providing benefits of $25,000.00 in the event of death regardless of cause
and the other providing a benefit of $25,000.00 only in case of accidental
death.

Plaintiff Terri Hardy is the named beneficiary of both policies.

The benefits under the first policy were paid and this action relates to
the accidental death policy which provides in pertinent part as follows:
Accidental Death: The Company will pay the sum for
vrtiich application was made by the Insured upon
receipt of due proof that the insured's death
resulted, directly and independently of all other
causes, from accidental bodily injury. . . .
(Stipulated Facts, paragraph 11; R. 837.)
12.

Prior to

Bryce Hardy's death, he had been diagnosed as

suffering from and had received treatment for drug dependency and abuse.
(R. 868-1020.) (Stipulated Facts, paragraph 12; R. 837.)
13.

Mr. Hardy began using Darvon (a trade name for propoxyphene)

by November, 1973. By November 1974, Mr. Hardy was abusing Darvon.

During

the years 1974, 1975, and 1976, Mr. Hardy was repeatedly counseled and
warned by his physician that he was using excessive amounts of Darvon.
(Stipulated F&cts, paragraph 13; R. 837-838.)
14.

In March 1977, Mr. Hardy attempted to commit suicide by taking

an overdose of Valium (a centrally acting tranquilizing depressant) tablets
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and alcohol and was transported by ambulance to a hospital in a comatose
state.

During this time period Mr. Hardy was very despondent about the

failure of his first marriage.
15.

(Stipulated Facts, paragraph 14; R. 838.)

In 1979, while employed as a miner with Emery Mining Company,

Mr* Hardy was involved in an accident which injured his back.
prescriptions for drugs for treatment of his back pain.

He received

At other times,

Mr. Hardy also received prescriptions for drugs for treatment of internal
disorders

associated

with

a

diseased

pancreas.

(Stipulated

Facts,

paragraph 15; R.838.)
16.

By late 1979, Mr. Hardy was dependent on, and misusing and

abusing narcotic drugs including codeine, Tylenol 3

(a combination of

acetaminophen and codeine), Darvon (propoxyphene), Tylox (a trade name for
oxycodone, a semi synthetic narcotic analgesic), Percodan (also a trade
name for oxycodone) and Valium.
17.
to

(Stipulated Facts, paragraph 16; R. 8380

During 1980, and 1981, Mr. Hardy manipulated several doctors

obtain prescriptions

for narcotic drugs.

As

a

result of these

manipulations he was able to obtain large quantities of prescription drugs
which he abused and misused.
18.

(Stipulated Facts, paragraph 17; R. 838.)

In March, 1981, Don C. Lankford, a Clinical Social Worker and

Certified Social Worker, met on three occasions with Mr. Hardy

at the

request of Dr. Robert T. Jackson, M.D., who was considering performing back
surgery on Mr. Hardy.

At the first meeting, Mr. lankford administered a

test known as the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI).

In

their second meeting Mr. lankford discussed the results of the MMPI test.
At that time, Mr. Hardy stated that he had a history of drug abuse and that
he was continuing to abuse and misuse drugs. He further stated that he had
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previously attempted suicide and that if he got a chance, he would kill
himself and that he wanted to die. Mir. Lankford told Mr. Hardy "that if he
did not stop abusing and misusing drugs, he would end up killing himself."
Mr. Lankford further advised Mr. Hardy to seek help at the St. Benedict's
Hospital

or

problems.

at his local mental health center for his serious drug

After his meetings with Mr. Hardy, Mr. Lankford advised Dr.

Jackson against performing surgery on Mr. Hardy and that surgery was never
performed.

At the time Mr. Lankford met with Mr. Hardy, Mr. Lankford was

of the opinion that Mr. Hardy understood the counsel which he had given him
and

the

consequences

Defendant's

19.

his

continued

evidence would be as set

Lankford, R. 1022-1025.
evidence.

of

misuse

forth

and

abuse

of

drugs.

in the Affidavit of Don

Plaintiff has no evidence to contradict such

(Stipulated Facts, paragraph 18; R. 838-839.)
On three occasions in the spring of 1981, Mr. Hardy was

hospitalized for treatment of prescription drug dependency.

(Stipulated

Facts, paragraph 19; R. 839.)
20.

Mr. Hardy was hospitalized in Mountain View Hospital from

March 23, 1981, to March 28, 1981, and showed a marked dependency on drugs
such as Darvon, Tylox, Percodan and Amitriptyline (an antidepressant). He
requested high dosages of narcotic analgesics, but was taken off all
narcotic analgesics.

When the narcotic analgesics were withdrawn, Mr.

Hardy became hostile and irritable but later expressed gratitude for being
helped to rid himself of his dependency on such drugs.

(Stipulated Facts,

paragraph 20; R.839.)
21.

After his discharge from Mountain View Hospital in late March

1981, Mr. Hardy reverted to his old pattern of drug misuse and abuse.
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(Stipulated Facts, paragraph 21; R. 839-840•)
22.

On April

14, 1981, Mr. Hardy took an overdose of Darvon and

Methadone (a synthetic narcotic analgesic).

The overdose caused his body

to go into respiratory arrest. When his wife, Terri, observed Mr. Hardy in
respiratory arrest she tried to wake him up and when he didn't respond she
called an ambulance. He was taken by ambulance to Sanpete Valley Hospital
and admitted in a comatose state.
23.

(Stipulated Facts, paragraph 22; R.840.)

On the morning of April 15, 1981, medical personnel at Sanpete

Valley Hospital offered to transfer Mr. Hardy to a drug rehabilitation
center but Mr. Hardy refused and indicated he preferred to stay in the
hospital.

(Stipulated Facts, paragraph 23; R. 840e)

24. On the morning of April 17, 1981, medical personnel at the
Sanpete Valley Hospital again offered to transfer Mr. Hardy to a drug
rehabilitation center.
25.

(Stipulated Facts, paragraph 24; R. 840.)

On April 17, 1981, Mr. Hardy left Sanpete Valley Hospital

without a discharge order but soon telephoned back for help. He expressed
willingness to go to a drug rehabilitation center and arrangements were
made through the Manti Mental Health Center to transfer him to the Drug
Rehabilitation Program in the Psychiatric Department of Utah Valley
Hospital. Mr. Hard/ voluntarily admitted himself to that program on April
17, 1981, for treatment of drug abuse.

(Stipulated Facts, paragraph 25; R.

840.)
26.

While in Utah Valley Hospital from April 17, 1981, to April

27, 1981, Mr. Hardy admitted to various physicians and other medical
personnel that he was addicted to Valium and Percodan, that he had used 12
Valium tablets a day, that he had gone to many doctors to get drugs, that

14

he had used approximately 15-20 Percodan tablets a day, and that when
Percodan

was

not

available

he

vised

Tylox

if

Tylox

was

available.

(Stipulated Facts, paragraph 26; R. 840-841.)
27.

While in the hospital from April 17, 1981, to April 27, 1981,

the amounts of narcotic analgesics supplied to Mr. Hardy were gradually
reduced until discontinued entirely.

(Stipulated Facts, paragraph 27? R.

841.)
28.

In the course of Mr. Hardy's treatment at the Utah Valley

Hospital in April 1981, Dr. Robert Crist advised Mr. Hardy that "his
continued misuse and abuse of drugs would be a life-shortening process and
that he would be living on borrowed time."

Dr. Crist advised him that

"those who abuse and misuse drugs, in the manner which he had done, live
very short lives and that few of those who continue to abuse and misuse
drugs to the degree that Bryce W. Hardy had done lived beyond the age of
thirty."

Mr. Hardy voiced his understanding of the advise given by Dr.

Crist. Defendant's evidence would be as set forth in the Affidavit of
Robert Crist, M.D., (R. 1027-1029.)
such evidence.
29.

Plaintiff has no evidence to contradict

(Stipulated Facts, paragraph 28; R. 841.)

While

in Utah Valley Hospital

in April

1981, Mr. Hardy

expressed to a nurse, Diane Sandstrcm Nance, his understanding that he
needed to overcame his drug abuse problem, otherwise he would die as a
result of his misuse and abuse of drugs.

Diane Nance noted in the

Inpatient Psychiatric Nurses Notes as follows:
[Mr. Hardy] came to seme conclusions in group
therapy.
[He] decided to let his wife knew and
help her to understand his reasons for being here.
That even though she needs him at heme new, in the
long run he needs to be here. He said he'd rather
be here for awhile than be dead.
15

(Stipulated Facts, paragraph 29; R. 841.)
30.

On his release from Utah Valley Hospital on April 27, 1981 f

Mr. Hardy was referred to the Central Utah Mental Health Clinic for
outpatient treatment of drug abuse.

(Stipulated Facts, paragraph 30; R.

841.)
31.

After his discharge from Utah Valley Hospital in late April

1981, Mr. Hardy again reverted to drug abuse and misuse.

(Stipulated

Facts, paragraph 31; R. 842.)
32.

From May 21, 1981, to May 31, 1981, Mr. Hardy was again

hospitalized

in Utah Valley Hospital for treatment for drug abuse.

(Stipulated Facts, paragraph 32; R. 842.)
33.

While in Utah Valley Hospital in late May 1981, Mr. Hardy was

again counseled and admonished about his drug problem.

(Stipulated Facts,

paragraph 33; R. 842.)
34.

Bryce Hardy was a person of normal intelligence and was not

suffering from any mental disease or defect during his life or at the time
of his death which prohibited him from understanding the warnings which he
had received

relating to continued drug abuse and misuse or from

understanding that the probable and expected consequence of continual
misuse and abuse of drugs would be his untimely death. Mr. Hardy expressed
an understanding of the counsel and warnings given to him by these health
care professionals regarding the dangers of his continued drug abuse and
misuse and there is no evidence that at the time of his death he was not
able to comprehend the consequences of his acts.

Defendant's evidence

would also be as set forth in the Affidavit of Bryan S. Finkle, (R.10311062.) Plaintiff has no evidence to contradict such evidence. (Stipulated
16

Facts, paragraph 34; R. 842.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1.

In adjudicating this appeal, this Court is free to review the

Stipulated Facts and to make its own conclusions of law.
2.

Under the principles set forth in Richards v. Standard Accident

Insurance Co., 58 Utah 622, 200 P. 1017 (1921), Mr. Hardy's death was not
an accident.

Because Mr. Hardy recognized that the natural and probable

consequence of his course of action in abusing drugs was his eventual
death, and his death resulted from an abuse of drugs, Mr. Hardy intended or
expected that his ingestion of drugs on the night of September 9, 1981,
would cause his death on September 10, 1981.

The trial court's Conclusion

of Law to the contrary is in error.

ARGUMENT

I.

THE STANDARD OF REVIEW

This case was submitted by the parties to the District Court for
trial on Stipulated F&cts. (R. 835-842)

The District Court adopted the

Stipulated Facts as its Findings of Fact and the facts are not in dispute.
(R. 832)
The issue before this Court is whether the Conclusion of Law reached
by the court belcw is in error.
In reviewing this matter, this Court is not bound by the trial
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court's Conclusion of Law, nor is it obligated to give the trial court's
conclusions any special deference.

Western Kane County Special Service

District No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Company. 744 P. 2d 1376, 1377-78 (Utah
1987).
In adjudicating this appeal, this court is free to review the
Stipulated Facts,

and to make its own conclusions of law and to enter

judgment based thereon.
In view of the conceded facts, which cannot be
disputed, and in view of the well-settled law,
there is - there can be - but one conclusion in
this case . . . . in view that the result entirely
depends upon a legal question, this court should
end the litigation between the parties and now
declare the legal conclusion that the district
court should have declared.
Willis v. Kronendonk. 58 Utah 592, 605, 200 P. 1025, 1031 (1921).
Beneficial is entitled to have this case adjudicated under correct
principles of law0
Where a trial court has based its ruling on a
misunderstanding of the law, or might have done so,
and a correct application would have produced a
different result, the adversely affected party is
entitled to have the matter adjudicated under
correct principles of law.
Hoffman v. Life Insurance Co. of North America, 669 P.2d 410, 421-21 (Utah
1983).
II. THE DEAIH OF BRYCE W. HARDY WAS NOT ACCIDENTAL

Hie insurance policy in issue provides in pertinent part as follows:
Accidental Death: Ihe Company will pay
the sum for which application was made by
the Insured upon receipt of due proof
that the insured's death resulted,
directly and independently of all other
causes, from accidental bodily injury...

18

(Stipulated Facts, paragraph 11; R. 837.)
Ihis appeal presents this issue:

Given the facts that (1) Bryce W.

Hardy's death resulted from the misuse and abuse of drugs (Stipulated Facts
1, 2, 9 and 10; R. 835-37) and (2) that he had a long history of drug
misuse and abuse (Stipulated Facts 12-14, 16-22, 26, 31-32; R. 837-842),
and (3) that he understood and appreciated that the natural, probable and
expected consequences of his continued misuse and abuse of drugs would be
his untimely death (Stipulated Facts 29 and 34, R. 841-42.); should his
death be ruled accidental under the accidental death policy in question.
In Richards v. Standard Accident Insurance CO.. 58 Utah 622, 635,
200

P.

1017, 1022

(1921),

the Utah

Supreme Court

defined

the word

"accident" or "accidental," as used in the context of accidental death
insurance policies, as follows:
The authorities generally hold that death
...does not result from accident . . .
within the terms of an accident insurance
policy where the ... death is the natural
and probable result of the insured's
voluntary act imacccottpanied by anything
unforeseen except the death .
(emphasis added)

In discussing the "authorities," the Richards Court quoted with
approval frcm Western Commercial Travelers7 Association v. Smith, 85 F.
401, 405 (8th Cir. 1898):
The significance of this word "accidental" is best
perceived by a consideration of the relation of
causes to their effects. The word is descriptive
of means which produce effects which are not their
natural and probable consequences. . . . An effect
which is the natural and probable consequence of an
act or course of action is not an accident . . . It
is either the result of actual design, or it falls
under the maxim that every man must be held to
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intend the natural and probable consequences of his
deeds, (emphasis added)
58 Utah at 636, 200 P. at 1023.
The Richards Court also quoted from Lickleider v. Traveling Men^s
Association, 184 Iowa 423, 166 N.W. 363, 366 (Iowa 1918):
It may be, and it is, true that, if the insured
does a voluntary act, the natural, usual, and to be
expected result of which is to bring injury upon
himself, then a death so occurring is not an
accident.
To illustrate: A. may be foolhardy
enough to believe that he can leap from a fourthstory window with safety, and, trying it, is
killed.
B., desiring to descend from the same
floor, climbs out upon a fire escape, which
collapses, and he falls to his death. In no proper
sense of the word is A.'s death accidental . . .
nor can any reasonable person deny that B. 's death
is accidental, (emphasis added)
58 Utah at 636, 200 P. at 1023.
The

Richards

case

defined

the phrase

"natural

and probable

consequence" as follows:
The natural consequence... [is] the consequence which
ordinarily follows . . . the result which may be reasonably
anticipated . . . and which ought to be expected. The
probable consequence . . . is the consequence which is more
likely to follow . . . than it is to fail to follow,
(emphasis added.)
58 Utah at 636, 200 P. at 1023.
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently applied the principles set
forth in the Richards case to various factual situations.

See Carter v.

Standard Accident Insurance Co.. 65 Utah 465, 238 P. 259, 274-275 (1925);
Billincrs v. Continental Life Insurance Co.. 81 Utah 572, 577-78, 21 P. 2d
103, 106 (1933); Whatcott v. Continental Casualty Co., 85 Utah 406, 39 P.
2d 733, 736 (1935); Sanders v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co..

104 Utah

75, 83, 138 P. 2d 239, 242-43 (1943); Handley v. Mutual Life Insurance CO.,
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106 Utah 184, 192, 147 P. 2d 319, 322-323 (1944); Kellogg v. California
Western States Life Insurance Oo.. 114 Utah 567, 201 P. 2d 949 (1949);
Thompson v. American Casualty Co., 20 Utah 2d 418, 439 P. 2d 276 (1968).
The most recent Utah Supreme Court case involving accidental death
is Hoffman v. Life Insurance Co. of North America, 669 P. 2d 410 (Utah
1983), which also applied the Richards principles.

In Hoffman, the Supreme

Court explained that the determination of whether death is the natural and
probable result of a person's act or course of action is to be made from
the point of view of that person.
Thus, a person is the victim of an accident vftien,
from the victim's point of view . . . the injury or
death is not a natural and probable result of the
victim's own acts.
Id. at 416.
An examination of the facts in this case, in light of the Richards
and Hoffman cases, is in order.

Ihis examination involves two steps.

First, determine the cause of death, and second, determine whether death
from that cause, frcm the viewpoint of the decedent, was the natural and
probable result of the decedent's act or course of action.
Ihe parties in this case have stipulated as to the cause of Mr.
Hardy's death.

He died on September 10, 1981, from the misuse and abuse of

prescription drugs resulting in narcotic intoxication.
1, 2, 9, 10, R-835-37.)

(Stipulated Facts

Ihe sole remaining issue is whether Mr. Hardy's

death from this cause was expected

or anticipated by him.

Ihe tried court concluded that death was accidental because the
Stipulated Facts did not "demonstrate that Mr. Hardy either intended or
expected that his consumption of drugs would cause his death on September
10, 1981." Uiis conclusion is erroneous.
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A, Mr. Hardy expected to die on September 10, 1981
from his misuse and abuse of drugs.

As fully set forth in the Stipulated Facts,

Mr. Hardy had been

misusing and abusing drugs for many years prior to his deatho

The record

discloses the he was using drugs in November of 1973, and within a year he
was abusing and misusing those drugs. (Stipulated Fact 13; R. 837-38.) This
misuse and abuse continued unabated from 1974 until his death in 1981.
(Stipulated Facts 12-14, 16-22, 26, 31-32; R. 837-842.)

In 1977 he was

admitted to a hospital in a comatose condition, having attempted suicide by
taking an overdose of Valium tablets and alcohol. In April of 1981 he was
again hospitalized in a comatose state, again as result of the misuse and
abuse of drugs. Throughout a period covering eight years he was repeatedly
warned by his physicians and others that if he did not stop abusing and
misusing prescription drugs he would "end up killing himself." (Stipulated
Fact 18; R. 838-839.) Mr. Hardy himself recognized that if he continued in
his course of action of abusing and misusing drugs he would end up "dead".
(Stipulated Fact 29; R. 841.)
In Richards, the Supreme Court stated that death is not accidental
if it is the "natural and probable result of the insured's voluntary act
unaccompanied by anything unforeseen except the death".

58 Utah at 635,

200 P. at 1022. As the Stipulated Facts reveal, Mr. Hardy understood "that
the probable and esqpected consequence of his continued misuse and abuse of
drugs would be his untimely death".
[T]he common meaning of the term [accident] is
defined in terms of whether the event was naturally
and probably expected or anticipated by the
22

insured.
• • • •

[Wjhere the insured expected or anticipated that
death would follow from his or her conduct recovery
has been denied.
• • • •

Thus, if the insured actually knows that his or her
death is more likely than not to occur, the death
is not accidental, (emphasis added)
Hoffman, 669 P. 2d at 416, 417, 419.
Mr. Hardy's death, on September 10, 1981, from the misuse and abuse
of

drugs was

accidental.
erroneous.

expected by him and,

by definition,

cannot be deemed

The trial court's Conclusion of Law to the contrary is clearly
Applying

the

principles

of

Richards

and

Hoffman

to

the

Stipulated Facts of this case: "an effect [death from the misuse and abuse
of drugs] which is the natural and probable consequence of an act or course
of action [continued drug abuse and misuse over an eight year period of
time] is not an accident".

B.

Mr. Hardy intended to die on September 10, 1981,
frcm his misuse and abuse of drugs.

The Stipulated Facts referred to in II. A., above, also demonstrate
that Mr. Hardy intended that his consumption of drugs would cause his death
on September 10, 1981.

In the Richards case the Supreme Court stated that

an effect "vdiich is the natural and probable consequence of an act or
course of action is not an accident . . . It is either the result of actual
design, or it falls under the maxim that every man must be held to intend
the natural and probable consequences of his deeds.»

58 Utah at 636, 200

P. at 1023. (Emphasis added)
Mr. Hardy understood that death would be the natural and probable
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consequence of continued drug abuse and misuse. (Stipulated Fact 29, 34? R.
841-42.) Mr. Hardy did, on the occasion of his death, misuse and abuse
drugs.

By virtue of the maxim stated above, he must be held to have

intended the natural and probable consequences of his deeds and therefore
the facts establish not only that he ejected, but that he intended that
his consumption of drugs would result in his death on September 10, 1981.

C. In relating a cause to its effect, the court
must consider the entire course of action not
merely a single act.

It may be that court below rested its Conclusion of Law upon the
premise that, in determining whether death was intended or expected, the
court can look only to the events immediately preceding the event of death,
that is, examine only the events of the night of September 9, 1981, and the
morning of September 10, 1981.

Indeed, a review of the Minute Entry made

by the Court on February 9, 1988, discloses that the trial court may well
have rested its conclusion on such premise.

(R.826-29.) Such a conclusion

would be erroneous.
In Kellogg v. California Western States Life Insurance Co., 114 Utah
567, 201 P. 2d 949 (1949), the Supreme Court sustained a decision by the
trial court that death was non-accidental under the following facts. Hie
deceased insured died from post-operative shock.

A year prior to his

death, the insured had suffered severe post-operative shock following
surgery.

Hie deceased, despite his post-operative shock experience from

the first surgery, decided to undergo the second operation.

He suffered

post-operative shock and died. The Supreme Court, in reviewing this matter
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did not confine its analysis of whether the deceased expected or intended
to die as a result of the second surgery merely to the events immediately
preceding the second surgery.

It found it appropriate, necessary and

logical to include in its analysis the earlier operation and post operative
shock in order to determine What the deceased would reasonably anticipate
or expect as a result of undergoing the second operation.
[T]he evidence shows that the deceased suffered shock after
the first operation, which was a less complicated operation.
In the second operation it was discovered deceased's
condition was such that the operation was going to be long
and hard .... If the first or lesser operation was productive
of shock, it is very likely that the second or greater
operation will magnify that shock accordingly.

[T]he question of accident lies in the question of the
anticipatory nature of the results, which in turn should be
measured by the susceptibility of the deceased to such
results . . . Specifically applied here: Deceased's previous
experience with shock from a lesser operation coupled with
his physical condition, including that disclosed upon the
initiation of the second operation, viewed in the light of
the nature and the length [of the second operation] are all
facts which support the belief that death was not accidental.
Fost-qperative shock to a dangerous degree was very likely to
him.
He was a poor risk, as one doctor indicated.
His
history made a bad prognosis, said the other.
These principles we have discussed are illustrated in
the case of Cooper v. New York Life Insurance Co., 1947, 198
Okl. 611, 180 P. 2d 654. In that case a patient died from
poisoning, the result of the injection of morphine sulphate,
a recognized method of treatment.
The case discloses no
history of any abnormality in the deceased. The result was
extraordinary and unanticipated.
It was held accidental.
Suppose, however, evidence has been produced that previously
in the course of an operation deceased had reacted violently
to such an injection, although he did not pass away. Would
that make a difference in solving the question of accident?
Certainly the rule of unexpectedness must be governed by the
facts evidencing a susceptibility of the victim to the
attendant results.
Each individual may be considered the
average individual unless the facts disclose that in reality
he is not; and **ien the facts do so show, then the question
of the accidental nature of the result must be measured by
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this knowledge, [citation omitted] If the deceased is in a
physical condition vfaich has reduced his resistance, it
stands to reason that he is not going to withstand an
operation as well as the normal man. If, in addition to the
strain he is susceptible to shock, it seems almost conclusive
that serious results may be likely. Tto speak of his death as
accidental under such circumstances is to say that such death
is always accidental, as there would be no measure for
dividing it into two classes of accidental and nonaccidental, (emphasis added)
Id. at 571-74, 201 P. 2d at 952-53.
In this case, the trial court apparently looked merely to the events
occurring on the night of September 9, 1981, and the morning of September
10, 1981. Ihe court failed to consider Mr. Hardy's long history of misuse
and abuse of drugs and Mr. Hardy's knowledge of what would inevitably occur
from continued misuse of drugs. Mr* Hardy's death cannot be viewed in a
vacuum. What was to be reasonably anticipated and expected must be viewed
"by the fact evidencing a susceptibility of the victim to the attendant
results." It must be viewed in the light of Mr. Hardy's history of misuse
and abuse of drugs and measured by the fact that Mr. Hardy expected that he
would die from exactly what caused his death, a drug overdose as the result
of drug misuse and abuse.

When viewed in this light there can be no

conclusion other than that the deceased died on September 10, 1981, as he
anticipated and expected that he would.
"Each individual may be considered the average
individual unless the facts disclose that in
reality he is not; and when the facts do so show,
then the question of the accidental nature of the
result must be measured by this knowledge."
Kellogg v. California Western States Life Insurance
Oo., supra, 114 Utah at 574, 201 P. 2d at 952.
Since the reason for this rule is that the
subjective state of mind of the insured cannot
generally be known, the law presumes that the
insured is a "reasonable person" or "average
individual" and applies an objective test unless
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the evidence shews that the insured is not an
"average iixiividual." Therefore, when the actual
state of mind of the insured can be established,
the probability of death resulting frcm certain
conduct should be judged in light of that state of
mind.
Hoffman, 669 P. 2d at 419.
The facts in this case disclose that Mr. Hardy was not an "average
individual", as far as drugs were concerned, on the evening prior to his
death.

The average individual is not a drug addict who has used and abused

drugs over many years, **io has been hospitalized on several occasions, two
of \diich were in a conatose condition as a result of drug overdoses, and
who had received professional counseling assuring him that his continued
abuse of drugs would result in his death.
reasonable mind can conclude that his

Given that background, no

death was the result of an accident.

The trial court rested its decision on the conclusion that the evidence was
insufficient to prove that Mr. Hardy intended or expected
September 10, 1981, from his misuse of drugs.
principles recited in the case authorities,

to die on

As supported by the

the trial court should have

asked the question, "Did he intend or expect to die from the misuse or
abuse of drugs?"

If so, and if he died from the abuse of drugs, the death

was not an accident.
While, as set forth above, Mr. Hardy was not an "average individual"
so far as drug use was concerned, he "was a person of normal intelligence
and was not suffering from any mental disease or defect." (Stipulated Fact
34; R. 842.)
The reason men secure accident insurance is to
protect them from the unforeseen, unusual, and
unexpected injury that mi^tit happen to them while
pursuing the usual and ordinary routine of their
daily vocation, or the doing of the things that men
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do in the common everyday affairs of life* We are
of opinion that the better reasoning points out,
and the weight of authority holds the true test to
be, that if in the act which precedes the injury,
though an intentional act, something unusual,
unforeseen, and unexpected occurs, which produces
the injury, it is accidental; but, if in the act
which precedes the injury something usual,
foreseen, and expected occurs, which produces the
injury* it is not accidentally effected. (emphasis
added)
Richards, 58 Utah at 634, 200 P. at 1022.
Mr. Hardy's death from drug abuse cannot be viewed as being
unforseen by him, nor unusual, nor unexpected, nor can it be perceived as
having- occurred while he was pursuing the usual and ordinary routine of his
daily vocation or in the common everyday affairs of his life.

It was

foreseen by him, expected by him and occurred as the result of his
voluntary act in an activity which was known to hiia to be dangerous and
deadly.

OONOUSiaN

Mr. Hardy's history of drug abuse presents the case of a man playing
Russian roulette. He knew he was playing a very dangerous game. On two
earlier- occasions, he had, in effect, "shot himself in the head" but
emergency medical attention had saved his life.

He had been repeatedly

warned that playing the game would eventually result in his death. Mr«
Hardy had also been playing the game for a long time.

He knew that the

longer he played, the greater his certainty of dying became. He had already
pulled the trigger several times. In September, 1981, he finally pulled
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the trigger on the chamber containing the fatal bullet.
The natural

and probable consequence of Mr. Hardy's continued

playing of the game of drug abuse was death.

His death was not an

accident.
Ihe judgment of the trial court should be reversed and judgment in
favor of the Defendant-Appellant should be entered, denying recovery on the
insurance policy in question because Mr. Hardy's death was not the result
of accidental bodily injury*
Dated this 16th day of September, 1988.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT IAKE COUNTY

7

STATE OF UTAH

81

9

TERRI C. HARDY, widow of
BRYCE W. HARDY, deceased,
STIPULATED STATEMENT OF FACTS

101
11

121
13

Plaintiff,

vs.

Civil No. C-83-6569

BENEFICIAL LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,

Honorable Scott Daniels

Defendant.

14

151

The Plaintiff, by and through her counsel

of record M. David

16

Eckersley, and the Defendant, by and through its counsel of record George

17

J. Romney, stipulate as follows:

18

1.

Bryce Hardy died on September 10, 1981, as a result of a

19

narcotic intoxication resulting from ingestion of drugs which may lawfully

201

be obtained only by prescription.

21

2.

The Utah State Medical Examiner's report listed the cause of

221

death

23

intoxication'" and the Medical Examiner described the manner of death as

241

"Undetermined'1', as distinguished from "Accident", "Suicide", "Homicide" and

25

"Natural causes".

26

attached as Exhibit "A".

27

death as "Combined codeine, propoxyphene & trimothobenzamide intoxication"

281

as

a

"combined

codeine,

propoxyphene

and

trimothobenzamide

A copy of the Autopsy Report and Toxicology Report are
The Certificate of Death listed the cause of

I

occurring frem the "Ingestion of drugs" and described the manner of death

9

as "Undetermined if injured Accidentally or Purposely" as distinguished

o

from "Accident", "Suicide", "Hcmicide" and "Pending Investigation".

J ii

of the Death Certificate is attached hereto as Exhibit "B".

P-11
n\\
/

8

3.

11

the events preceding and immediately following Mr. Hardy's death.

14
15
16
17
18

4.

21
22
23
24
25
26

The Mt. Pleasant City Police Department prepared an Incident

Report describing events on the morning of Mr. Hardy's death.

A copy of

said report is attached as Exhibit "F".
5.

Plaintiff's evidence would shew that on the evening preceding

his death, Mr. Hardy did not appear anxious or depressed and he made no
statements, oral or written, reflecting any intention to take his own life*
His activities, as observed by his wife, Terri Hardy, were routine and
included making preparations for the next day's work at his job, reading to
his children and watching television.

Defendant has no evidence to

contradict such evidence.
6.

19
20

Copies

of these statements are attached as Exhibits "C", "D", and "E".

12
13

Following Mr. Hardy's death the Plaintiff, Terri C* Hardy, and

her friend Julie Shepherd gave written statements to the police describing

9
10

A copy

10,

On the night of September 9, 1981, or the morning of September

1981, Mr. Hardy took an undetermined

amount

of drugs containing

codeine*, propoxyphene (Darvon) and trimethobenzamide (Tigan).
7.

Codeine is a centrally acting narcotic analgesic.

is also a centrally acting narcotic analgesic.

Propoxyphene

Trimethobenzamide is an

anti emetic agent.
8.

The quantity of drugs ingested by Mr. Hardy prior to his death

is not able to be determined from the autopsy, toxicological analysis or

27
28
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I

any other existing data.

n

9.

o

There is no evidence of Bryoe Hardy having obtained by

prescription the drugs which he ingested on the occasion of his death.

A\
.

10. Defendant's evidence would shew that the ingested drugs were
self administered and were not prescribed by a physician for medical
purposes and constituted an abuse and misuse of prescription drugs.

6
-II

Plaintiff has no evidence to contradict such evidence. The ingested drugs

R

were taken despite treatment which Mr. Hardy had

received for withdrawal

from his addiction to such drugs and in contravention of the warnings and

9

counseling which he had received to stop taking such drugs.

10

11. At the time of his death Mr. Hardy was insured by Beneficial

11

Life Insurance Company under the terms of two group policies.

12

One

providing benefits of $25,000.00 in the event of death regardless of cause

13

and the other providing a benefit of $25,000.00 only in case of accidental

14

death.

15

Plaintiff Terri Hardy is the named beneficiary of both policies.

The benefits under the first policy were paid and this action relates to

16
17M
181]
1911
M

the accidental death policy which provides in pertinent part as follcws:
Accidental Death: The Company will pay the sum for
which application was made by the Insured upon
receipt of due proof that the insured's death
resulted, directly and independently of all other
causes, from accidental bodily injury. . . .
12. Prior to Bryce Hardy's death, he had been diagnosed as

21
suffering from and had received treatment for drug dependency and abuse.
22
Attached hereto
23

as Exhibit

"Q" are copies of medical reports and

prescription records relating thereto.
24
13. Mr. Hardy began using Darvon (a trade name for propoxyphene) by
25
November, 1973.

By November 1974, Mr. Hardy was abusing Darvon.

During

26
27
28
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1

the years 1974, 1975, and 1976, Mr. Hardy was repeatedly counseled and

2

warned by his physician that he was using excessive amounts of Darvon.

o

14. In March 1977, Mr. Hardy attempted to ccarardt suicide by taking

J

an overdose of Valium (a centrally acting tranquilizing depressant) tablets

.

and alcohol and was transported by ambulance to a hospital in a comatose
state.

Djring this time period Mr. Hardy was very despondent about the

failure of his first marriage.
jJI

9
10
11
12

15. In 1979, vftiile employed as a miner with Emery Mining Company,
Mr. Hardy was involved in an accident which injured his back. He received
prescriptions for drugs for treatment of his back pain.

Mr. Harc3y also received prescriptions for drugs for treatment of internal
disorders associated with a diseased pancreas.
16. By late 1979, Mr. Hardy was dependent on, and misusing and

13
14
15
16
17

abusing narcotic drugs including codeine, Tylenol 3 (a combination of
acetominophen and codeine), Darvon (propoxyphene), Tylox (a trade name for
oxycodone, a semi synthetic narcotic analgesic), Percodan (also a trade
name for oxycodone) and Valium.
17. During 1980, and 1981, Mr. Hart3y manipulated several doctors to

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

At other times,

obtain

prescriptions

for

narcotic

drugs.

As

a

result

of

these

manipulations he was able to obtain large quantities of prescription drugs
which he abused and misused.
18.

In March, 1981, Don C. lankford, a Clinical Social Wbrker and

Certified Social Worker, met on three occasions with Mr. Hardy

at the

request of Dr. Jackson who was considering performing back surgery on Mr*
Hardy. At the first meeting, Mr. lankford administered a test known as the
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory

(MMPI).

In their second

27
28
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«

meeting Mr. Lankford discussed the results of the MMPI test.

n

Mr. Hardy stated that he had a history of drug abuse and that he was

o

continuing to abuse and misuse drugs.

4

previously attempted suicide and that if he got a chance, he would kill

5
6

At that time

He further stated that he had

himself and that he wanted to die. Mr. Lankford told Mr. Hardy "that if he
did not step abusing and misusing drugs, he would end up killing himself."
Mr. lankford further advised Mr. Hardy to seek help at the St. Benedict's

7
Hospital

or

at his local mental health center

for his serious drug

8
problems.

After his meetings with Mr. Hardy, Mr. lankford advised Dr.

9
Jackson against performing surgery on Mr. Hardy and that surgery was never

10
performed.

At the time Mr. Lankford met with Mr. Hardy, Mr. Lankford was

11
of the opinion that Mr. Hardy understood the counsel which he had given him

12
and

the

consequences

of

his

continued

misuse

and

abuse

of

drugs.

13
Defendant's

evidence would be as set

forth

in the Affidavit

of Don

14
Lankford, attached hereto as Exhibit "H".

Plaintiff has no evidence to

15
contradict such evidence.

16
17
18
19

19.

On three occasions

in the spring of

1981, Mr. Hardy was

hospitalized for treatment of prescription drug dependency*
20.

Mr. Hardy was hospitalized in Mountain View Hospital from March

23, 1981, to March 28, 1981, and shewed a marked dependency on drugs such

20
as Darvon, Tylox, Peroodan and Amitriptyline

(an antidepressant).

He

21
requested high dosages of narcotic analgesics, but was taken off all

22
narcotic analgesics. When the narcotic analgesics were withdrawn Mr. Hardy

23
became hostile and irritable but later expressed gratitude for being helped

24
to rid himself of his dependency on such drugs.

25
21.

After his discharge fron Mountain View Hospital in late March

26
27
28
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j
9

1981, Mr. Hardy reverted to his old pattern of drug misuse and abuse.
22. On April

14, 1981# Mr. Hardy took an overdose of Darvon and

o

Methadone (a synthetic narcotic analgesic).

The overdose caused his body

J

to go into respiratory arrest. When his wife, Terri, observed Mr. Hardy in

pj

respiratory arrest she tried to wake him up and when he didn't respond she

/J

called an ambulance. He was taken by ambulance to Sanpete Valley Hospital

«. i and admitted in a comatose state,
g I

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

23. On the morning of April 15, 1981, medical personnel at Sanpete
Valley Hospital offered to transfer Mr. Hardy to a drug rehabilitation
center but Mr. Hardy refused and indicated he preferred to stay in the
hospital.
24. On the morning of April 17, 1981, medical personnel at the
Sanpete Valley Hospital again offered to transfer Mr. Hardy to a drug
rehabilitation center.
25. On April 17, 1981, Mr. Hardy left Sanpete Valley Hospital
without a discharge order but soon telephoned back for help. He expressed
willingness to go to a drug rehabilitation center and arrangements were
made through the Manti Mental Health Center to transfer him to the Drug
Rehabilitation Program in the Psychiatric Department of Utah Valley
Hospital. Mr. Hardy voluntarily admitted himself to that program on April
17, 1981, for treatment of drug abuse.
26. While in Utah Valley Hospital frcci April 17, 1981, to April 27,
1981, Mr. Hardy admitted to various physicians and other medical personnel
that he was addicted to Valium and Percodan, that he had used 12 Valium
tablets a day, that he had gone to many doctors to get drugs, that he had
used approximately 15-20 Percodan tablets a day, and that when Percodan was
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not available he used Tylox if Tylox was available.

2

27. While in the hospital from April 17, 1981, to April 27, 1981,

r,

the amounts of narcotic analgesics supplied to Mr. Hardy were gradually

4

reduced until discontinued entirely.

p.

28. In the course of Mr. Hardy's treatment at the Utah Valley
Hospital in April 1981, Dr. Robert Crist advised Mr. Hardy that "his

6

continued misuse and abuse of drugs would be a life-shortening process and

7

that he would be living on borrowed time."

8

Dr. Crist advised him that

"those who abuse and misuse drugs, in the manner which he had done, live

9

very short lives and that few of those who continue to abuse and misuse

10

drugs to the degree that Bryce W. Hardy had done lived beyond the age of

11

thirty."

12

Crist.

13

Mr. Hardy voiced his understanding of the advice given by Dr.
Defendant's evidence would be as set forth in the Affidavit of

Robert Crist, M.D., attached hereto as Exhibit "I".

14

Plaintiff has no

evidence to contradict such evidence.

15

29. While in Utah Valley Hospital

in April

1981, Mr. Hardy

16
expressed to a nurse, Diane Sandstrcm Nance, his understanding that he
17
needed to overcome his drug abuse problem, otherwise he would die as a
18
result of his misuse and abuse of drugs.

Diane Nance noted in the

19
Inpatient Psychiatric Nurses Notes as follcws:
20,,
21II
22 J |
2311

[Mr. Hardy] came to some conclusions in group
therapy.
[He] decided to let his wife knew and
help her to understand his reasons for being here.
That even though she needs him at heme new, in the
long run he needs to be here. He said he'd rather
be here for awhile than be dead.
30. On his release from Utah Valley Hospital on April

24

27, 1981, Mr.

25

Hardy was referred to the Central Utah Mental Health Clinic for outpatient

26

treatment of drug abuse.

27
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31. After his discharge front Utah Valley Hospital in late April
1981, Mr. Hardy again reverted to drug abuse and misuse.
32.

From May

21, 1981, to May 31, 1981, Mr. Hardy was again

hospitalized in Utah Valley Hospital for treatment for drug abuse.
33. While in Utah Valley Hospital in late May 1981, Mr. Hardy was
again counseled and admonished about his drug problem.
34. Hardy was a person of normal intelligence and was not suffering
from any mental disease or defect during his life or at the time of his
death which prohibited him from understanding the warnings which he had
received relating to continued drug abuse and misuse or from understanding
that the probable and expected consequence of continued misuse and abuse of
drugs would be his untimely death.

Mr. Hardy expressed an understanding of

the counsel and warnings given to him by these health care professionals
regarding the dangers of his continued drug abuse and misuse and there is
no evidence that at the time of his death he was not able to ccnprehend the
consecjuences of his acts.

Defendant's evidence would also be as set forth

in the Affidavit of Bryan S. Finkle, attached hereto as Exhibit

"3".

Plaintiff has no evidence to contradict such evidence.
DATED this

~~ day of January, 1988.
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M. David Ecfcersley
E c k e r s l e y ^ >
Attorney for Plaintiff

24["
25
26
27 I
281

8

00CS42

1

ROMNEY & CONDIE

21
31
4

George JSBfxarJef \
Atxorney fcovDefendant

51
6!
7
81
91
101
11
121
13
14
15
16
17
18]
19
201
21
221
23
24
25
26
27

281
OGCS&.5

A-2
MINUTE ENTRY

FiUED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake County Utah

FEB 1 0 7g
H. Wxcn H:nci£y, Clerk 3rc Dist Court
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Deruty Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT CCURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT IAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TERRI C. HARDY, ET AL,
Plaintiff,

MINUTE ENTRY

vs.
BENEFICIAL LIFE INSURANCE CO.,

CASE NO. C-83-6569

Defendant.

The Court having heard argument, having considered the memorandum and
the points and authorities filed by each party herein, and having read the
authorities cited to the Court rules herein as follows.
Motion for Summary Judgement is denied.

The Defendant's

Ihe Court having read the

authorities is of the opinion that the actions of the decedant in taking
drugs, vfriich ultimately caused his death, was not intended by the victim at
the time that the drugs were taken to cause his death.

The Court is of the

opinion that Hoffman v. Life Insurance Conparry of North America, 669 P. 2d
410 (Utah, 1983) and the standards set forth in Richards v. Standard
Accident Insurance Company 58 Utah 662, 200 P. 1017 (1921) govern herein.
It was in Richards that our Supreme Court first established the standard for
defining the words "accident" or "accidental."

It was there said, "the word

is descriptive of means vfriich produce effects which are not their natural

nnr«42b

HARDY V. BENEFICIAL LIFE

arid probable consequences...."

PAGE TWO

C-83-6569

It was further said there, "It is either the

result of actual design, or it falls under the maxim that every man must be
held to intend the natural and probable consequences of his deeds.11

Hoffman

then goes on to cite numerous cases in which the Richard's Standard had been
applied consistently by the Supreme Ocurt of Utah.
The argument between the parties here relates to, in effect, a time
continuum.

It would be the argument of the defense that Mr. Hardy's taking

of drugs knowing that continued drug usage over a period of time would
shorten his life, perhaps to the point where he would die before the age of
30 (which he in fact did), or that he could die at probably any time after
ingesting drugs would not meet the definition of accident in Hoffman and
Richards.

However, the problem is that under the Hoffman definition, his

taking of the drugs either must be the intended result or one which was
".. .the natural and probable consequences of his deeds."

There is no

evidence of intention in this case. As a matter of fact, the presumption is
against an attempted suicide and, thus, the latter phrase must be looked to.
While the Court could believe under some circumstances that a person
intended to die by taking excessive drugs given, the facts of this case
relating to Mr. Hardy's prior attempts at rehabilitation, his work pattern
the day before his death, and the activities carried on the evening before
his death, it is difficult for this Court to find as a matter of law that
the victim (through whose eyes we must see in order to determine the intent)
intended to die by taking drugs as he did.

This is particularly true given

*••». # ^ / •»tf"^,f~z t*4
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the general attitude of most humans vfrio undertake something risky.

It is

for the thrill of the risk and surviving it that the act is undertaken. It
is seldom intended, although it might be anticipated, that injury or death
might arise.
The Plaintiff's attorney will prepare the order denying Summary
Judgement.
Dated this

f t^

day of February, 1988.

Richard H/ Mbf
D i s t r i c t /Court! tfudge

ATTEST
H. DIXON HINDLEY
CLERK
Deputy b'erk

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a true and correct, postage prepaid copy of the
foregoing Minute Entry was mailed to:
George Romney, Esq.
700-38 Eagle Gate Tcwer
60 East South Temple
Salt late City, OT 84111
David J. Holdsworth
700-38 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Virginius Dabney, Esq.
Kearns Building - Suite 412
136 South Main Street
Salt late City, UT 84101
M. David Eckersley, Esq.
419 Boston Building
Salt Late City, UT 84111
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Sell

'ICE

MAY 9 1S33
M. David Eckersley (0956)
HOUPT & ECKERSLEY
Attorney for Plaintiff
419 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-0453
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

&kc£/3

TERRI C. HARDY, et al.,

AJo- 990 b

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
BENEFICIAL LIFE INSURANCE
CO. ,

Civil No: C-83-6569

Defendant.

This matter was submitted to the Court upon stipulated
facts.

Trial was held on January 27, 1988, with plaintiff being

represented by David Eckersley and defendant by George J.
Romney.

The Court, having reviewed the stipulation and attached

exhibits, and having considered the arguments and memoranda
of counsel hereby enters the following order:
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Court finds the facts to be those set forth in
the stipulation executed by the parties and filed with the Court
on January 27, 1988.

OOCS2'-11

CONCLUSION OF LAW
As the stipulated facts do not demonstrate that
Mr. Bryce Hardy either intended or expected that his consumption
of drugs would cause his death on September 10, 1981, the Court
concludes that Mr. Hardy's death was the result of accidental
bodily injury within the meaning of the insurance policy in
question.
JUDGMENT
Judgment is hereby entered in favor of plaintiff
Terri C. Hardy and against defendant Beneficial Life Insurance
Company in the amount of $25,000.00, together with prejudgment
interest at the rate of 107o per annum from November 10, 1981
until the date of this Judgment.
DATED this V

day of May, 1988.

BY THE COUR'

ATTEST
H. DlXui. hsNDLEY
CLXRK

Approved as to form:

By

-2-

puiy oierK

nnn &**<->

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was mailed this I^L day of April, 1988, to the
following:
George J. Romney
ROMNEY & CONDIE
60 East South Temple
700-38 Eagle Gate Tower
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

HOUPT & ECKERSLEY^

